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OF
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

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THE FUTURE

OF

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE FUTURE

OF

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

AND

THE ATTITUDE OF THE GREAT POWERS

BY

SCOTUS VIATOR

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INTRODUCTION.

It has become the fashion in this country to assume that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy will collapse at the death of its reigning sovereign, the venerable Francis Joseph. The object of the following pages is to show that this is an entirely superficial view, based upon a neglect or a misreading of history. Many parties and many individuals in different countries of Europe have a strong interest in the diffusion of such an idea; and the existence of these hidden forces will, I venture to maintain, become obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to point a moral to the facts adduced below. Much capital has been made by various writers out of the disruptive tendencies of racial hatred. But far too little has been allowed for the difficulties which such disruption would involve. Even if we assume that the artichoke would fall an easy prey to foreign aggression—and this I for one cannot for a moment admit—the ensuing rivalries of the Powers would be a source of endless dangers and confusion, and would mean

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something far worse than burnt fingers for everyone concerned.

Moreover, those who assume that Austria-Hungary's existence depends upon the life of the present Emperor-King, overlook one supremely important factor in the situation—namely, the Heir Apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. On all sides he is admitted to be an enigma, and disparaging reports of his character have sedulously been put abroad. But here again the motives which prompt such reports are too obvious to require sifting; and there are many reasons for believing that the future Emperor-King will be a worthy successor of his uncle. All tends to show that he is at once able and self-reliant, a man who knows the full value of silence and of speech, and who is neither afraid to have convictions nor to act upon them.

Special stress has been laid on the relations of Austria-Hungary with Servia and Roumania, owing to the fact that they are so often omitted from a discussion of the subject. On the other hand, it would only have complicated the issue to treat at any adequate length the Turkish Question, as it affects the Dual Monarchy. Besides, for various reasons it would no longer be so germane to my subject (as defined on the title-page) as it was thirty years ago. (1) The rise of barrier States in

the Balkans has greatly modified Austria-Hungary's relations to the Porte. (2) This and the growth of national feeling in the Peninsula makes Russian expansion less probable than in 1854 or 1877. (3) The equanimity with which Austria-Hungary has come to regard the situation in Macedonia was first revealed by the Mürzsteg Agreement, and has been strikingly confirmed by her recent understanding with Italy on the subject of Albania (see pp. 25—26).

I have intentionally refrained from discussing the attitude of France or Great Britain. Both countries have an obvious interest in the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power. But this interest is entirely negative, and in no way affected by the internal problems of the Dual Monarchy. It is dictated solely by considerations of the Balance of Power in Europe, which would be fatally disturbed by a partition of Austria-Hungary, or even by a separation of the two sister States. Once grant my facts and the premisses of my arguments, and the inevitable conclusion is reached, that France and Great Britain must make every effort to preserve the Dual Monarchy (however modified internally) as a political and economic unit in the modern world.

SCOTUS VIATOR.

23rd April, 1907.

My best acknowledgments are due to the Editor of the *Spectator* for kindly permitting me to reproduce certain articles of mine which have appeared in his columns during the past eighteen months.

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CHAPTER I.

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

"If there were no Austria, it would be necessary to create one." These words of the great Bohemian historian, Palacky, form a fitting introduction to any discussion of the so-called Austrian question. The political ravens of Europe have for some years past been forecasting the fate of Austria-Hungary, and justify their croakings by the view that one whose inheritance is so much debated during his lifetime can hardly be in a robust state of health. Indeed, the Austrian question, like that of the Near East, haunts the dreams of the modern statesman, and renders uncertain the whole political future of Europe.

What, then, would be the results of the partition of the Hapsburg Empire, and who would derive advantage from it? From the nature of the case,

such fragments as failed to assert their independence at the final catastrophe would fall to the share of Austria's three chief neighbours,—Germany, Russia, and Italy. If, leaving aside for the moment the two latter Powers, we look at the question from a specially German point of view, it will be found that the Power which runs the most serious risks from a forward policy in Austria, is no other than Germany herself. And for this contention we may take the words of Bismarck as our text: "The preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a strong and independent Government is *for Germany* a necessity of the balance of power in Europe."

The propaganda of the Pan-German League, the ravings of such leaders as Schoenerer and Wolf, and the *Los von Rom* movement, which is engineered by this wildest of all political parties—all these have thrown a somewhat lurid light upon the future of Austria, and have made us familiar with the possibility of German expansion at the expense of her Southern ally. Such a policy offers many attractions to the political dreamer. In the first place, a compact State would be formed in Central Europe, far surpassing in strength the Mediæval Empire in its most brilliant days. With a population of close upon eighty millions, its armed forces would be irresistible, and Greater

Germany would be relieved from much of the anxiety which her exposed frontiers cause the German Empire of to-day. The dream of the poet Arndt would be realised, and (save for the Eastern Swiss cantons) the German Fatherland would at length be conterminous with the language of Luther and of Goethe. A fatal blow would be dealt to the growing "Slav peril," and the Cisleithan provinces would be finally rescued for German culture and ideals. German commerce would receive a powerful impetus from the extension of the *Zollverein* to Austria, and would control an internal market as large as that of the United States. The acquisition of Trieste would ensure fresh triumphs to the German merchant marine, while the Austrian Navy would be a genuine windfall for "the Admiral of the Atlantic"! Germany would become, beyond all question, the predominant Power in the Balkans; and her hegemony from Hamburg to Bassora, on the Persian Gulf, would soon enter the range of practical politics.

The casual observer might be pardoned for assuming that such vast advantages would outweigh all possible risks or sacrifices. But before adopting such a view, he would do well to examine the reverse of the medal. The dangers of a forward policy may be described as twofold—external and

internal. In the first place, there is the prospect of foreign intervention, rendered all the more likely by Germany's present isolation. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Austria-Hungary, despite its domestic quarrels, forms the pivot of European politics, and that its disappearance would deal a fatal blow to the balance of power. Without enlarging upon the dangers in which such a situation would involve France,[1] it is enough to say that her very existence as a Great Power would be at stake; and this view has been emphasised, perhaps not all too wisely, in the speeches of such well-known politicians as MM. Deschanel and Pelletan. Assuming for the moment that Great Britain succeeded in holding aloof from the quarrel—a highly doubtful contingency—it is well-nigh certain that Italy and Russia would be drawn into war on the French side, and that certain Balkan rulers would employ the occasion to fish in troubled waters. Strange as it may sound, the only conceivable ally for Germany is Hungary, and then only in return for such concessions as would ill suit the Pan-German mood. In any case, her assistance would be largely discounted by the Magyar lack of artillery, and by the temptation which such

[1] These have been ably expounded by such writers as MM. Chéradame and René Henry, though in a spirit of distinct hostility to Germany.

a crisis would offer to the Roumanians to make a bid for Transylvania. Thus the probable result of German intervention would be a European coalition against the Hohenzollern. History would repeat itself, but with one important exception: there would be no British subsidies, such as rendered possible Frederick the Great's resistance to Europe in arms.

But quite apart from external complications, the idea of annexation is not so simple as it appears at first sight. If Germany contents herself with the seven German-speaking provinces (Upper and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Styria, Carinthia), what is to become of Bohemia? The Czechs, whether under a kingdom or a republic, are not strong enough to stand alone, even if there were no hostile German minority to complicate the internal problem. Union with Hungary is inconceivable, and thus they would of necessity gravitate towards Russia. This would place the Slav Colossus across the direct line of communications between Berlin and Vienna, and would assure to St. Petersburg—whether as the master or the adviser of Prague—immense geographical and strategic advantages. Bismarck's phrase, "The master of Bohemia will be the master of Europe," would be startlingly fulfilled. Thus Germany would have no choice but to include

Bohemia and Moravia (with Austrian Silesia) in the enlarged German Empire, a step which would of course meet with fierce opposition from the six million Czechs, who dream of a restored kingdom of Bohemia. Moreover, in their resistance the Czechs would have the support of the South Slavs —Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs—who people Carniola, Istria, and Dalmatia. For Germany in her advance southwards could not stop short at the linguistic frontier near Klagenfurt, but would lay claim to Trieste and the Adriatic seaboard. Indeed, the possession of a port on the Mediterranean, directly connected with Hamburg and Bremen, may be said to form the chief attraction of such a policy of expansion. This would, however, make desperate enemies of all believers in the restoration of an Illyrian kingdom, or in the rival dream of a greater Servia, and would probably involve a slow and harassing guerilla war in the Istrian Alps. Besides, let us suppose Germany to be successful in quelling their united resistance; she would still be faced with the task of controlling eleven and a half millions of disaffected Slavs within the borders of her own Empire, a problem before which that of Ireland would appear a trifle. Nor is this by any means all. The occupation of Trieste by Germany would be bitterly resented, not merely by the Irredentists, but by the whole Italian

nation, and would inevitably lead to a war, in which Italy could probably count on allies. In all circumstances, it would finally ruin the Triple Alliance, throw Italy into the arms of the Western Powers, and leave Germany with Abdul-Hamid as her only ally. While Italy's enmity is inevitable, Russia, it may be argued, might be appeased by a share in the spoils. But such a share could only take the form of Galicia and the Bukowina, and by the annexation of the former the chief step would be taken towards the reconstruction of Poland. The two main divisions of the Polish race would thus be reunited, forming a compact State of thirteen million inhabitants; and the Prussian Poles would become more unmanageable than ever. The danger from this quarter would be increased, rather than diminished, by the triumph of the Russian Revolution, for one of its inevitable consequences will be the grant of Polish autonomy.

So much for the Slav races of Austria. But are we to suppose that even the Germans of Austria would be unanimous for incorporation? The Austrian is nothing if not loyal; and the first price that he would have to pay for union with Germany would be the loss of the dynasty, with which six centuries of glorious traditions are bound up. For it is obvious that no Hapsburg would ever consent to become the vassal of the King of Prussia.

German Austria, therefore, would sink to the level of provinces, and take up a position similar to that of Alsace-Lorraine, on a larger scale. The present *régime* of easy-going *Gemüthlichkeit* would be replaced by the "*stramme Disziplin*" of the Prussian system; and above all, Vienna, the pride of every Austrian's heart, from an Imperial capital would become a mere provincial city.

But what of Germany herself? In the first place, she would cease to be a Protestant Power. In the present German Empire there are (in round numbers) 35¼ million Protestants to 20 million Catholics (or 62 to 36 per cent). The annexation of the Austrian provinces would alter these proportions to 35¾ million Protestants to 41 million Catholics (or 46 to 53 per cent). Among the far-reaching effects of this change, the Catholic *Centrum*, which already holds the balance in the Reichstag, would attain to a position of absolute predominance. These facts explain the desperate efforts of the Pan-Germans to further the *Los von Rom* movement in Austria. They understand the reluctance with which most North Germans would view any increase of the Roman Catholic element in the Empire, and hope to attain their end by wholesale proselytism. The Austrian Heir-Apparent, Francis Ferdinand, has been frequently attacked for the speech in which he asserted that

"Away from Rome" was merely another name for "Away from Austria." But no amount of criticism can obscure the fact that he was right, and he is hardly to be blamed for throwing down the gauntlet to the open enemies of his dynasty. But, above all else, the annexation of the Austrian provinces would prove fatal to the unity won in 1866 and 1870. It would revive the old rivalry of Prussia and Austria, which so long made Germany a negligible quantity in the affairs of Europe. Prussia would no longer enjoy the same predominant position, and the South German States, whose dislike for Prussia and her system is very real, might come to dream of a revision of the *status quo*. Dresden, Munich, and Stuttgart would gravitate towards Vienna, and the antagonism between North and South would be revived in an acuter form than ever. An internal balance of power, to the destruction of which Bismarck devoted his whole life, would be created once more on a new footing, and would seriously impair the efficiency of the Imperial machine. Again, it would be no easy task to assimilate the very different diplomatic ideals of Berlin and Vienna, of Bismarck and Bülow, as opposed to Beust, Andrássy, and Goluchowski, still less to satisfy at once the Prussian and Austrian aristocracy in the matter of diplomatic appointments. Nor would an extension of the fiscal frontier be an agreeable

change for the East Prussian Junker, whose selfish interests favour high meat prices and restrictions on foreign corn. Historic traditions, caste feeling, and fiscal convictions all combine to make Conservatives and Agrarians hostile to union with Austria, the more so as one probable result would be a special commercial agreement with Hungary, their chief agricultural rival.

Meanwhile the trend of events in Austria is hardly calculated to increase their enthusiasm. The great reform of last year has swept away the old curial system with all its compromises and anomalies, and introduced universal manhood suffrage in its place, the Austrian Chamber thus becoming one of the most democratic on the Continent. Coming half from below, through a spontaneous movement of the masses, and half from above, through the direct and open advocacy of the monarch, it should tend to strengthen the ties of affection which link the dynasty to its peoples, and to leave the House of Hapsburg more truly than ever "broad-based upon a people's will." It represents a genuine effort to reduce racial friction to a minimum, and thus to divert the lines of party cleavage from racial to political and social questions. Moreover, the reform was carried through by a Ministry which for the first time in recent years had a parliamentary majority at its

back; and the support which Baron von Beck has so far received from the country at large in the Ausgleich crisis, augurs well for the future. If then, as may fairly be hoped, both the dynasty and parliamentary government are strengthened by the change, a blow will have been struck at disruptive tendencies, and at the same time the inducements to the German Government will have been sensibly diminished. For the political effects of such an union would probably be to strengthen the very parties in the Reichstag on which Berlin looks with the greatest suspicion. The Centrum would gain the adhesion of the German Clericals, the Polish Club, and at least a section of the Czechs; the Progressives and the *Deutsch-Nationalen* would swell the parties of the Left; and the Social Democrats would be joined by their Austrian colleagues, who, being less extreme and less doctrinaire than Socialists of the Bebel school, would probably supply the necessary link for that working union of Labour and Bourgeoisie, which Dr. Barth has so long advocated in vain. All this might usher in a new era of Continental Democracy, but for that very reason it is not likely to commend itself to the classes which rule Prussia to-day.

Enough has been said to show that a forward policy is open to far more serious objections than the Pan-Germans in their fanaticism would have

us suppose. In the words of Bismarck, "We could not make use of German Austria, either in whole or in part, nor would the acquisition of provinces like Austrian Silesia and pieces of Bohemia tend to strengthen the Prussian State. An assimilation of German Austria would not ensue, nor would Vienna be governed as a mere annexe from Berlin." This is as true to-day as when the founder of modern Germany wrote his "Recollections." It would be absurd to maintain that his successors have proved worthy of the traditions of the Bismarckian era; but it is difficult to believe that they will thus rashly endanger the structure which they owe to his glorious exertions.

CHAPTER II.

RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Enough has been said to show that no Power is more interested than Germany in the preservation of the Hapsburg Monarchy as a strong and independent government, and that a policy of Pan-German expansion southwards, so far from strengthening the German Empire, would expose it to new dangers of the very gravest kind. I should now like to discuss the attitude of Russia to the same question, and to contrast the dangers which may be supposed to threaten the Dual Monarchy from Germany and Russia respectively. This is not without its bearing upon a recent controversy, for the Hohenlohe Memoirs have raised a number of issues affecting the mutual relations of the three empires. An attempt has been made to convict Bismarck of disloyalty to his Austrian ally, though it is difficult to see what evidence there is for such a theory. Limiting ourselves to a single quotation from the Memoirs, we find a record of Hohenlohe's conversation with Bismarck in March, 1890, on the possibility of war with Russia (Vol. 2, p. 461). Bismarck is

convinced that there will be no war, and adds, "We should only be compelled to strike, *if the existence of the Austrian Monarchy were threatened.*" This is merely one of the long array of proofs that the Bismarckian policy was from 1866 onwards essentially Austrophil, and in Bismarck's own words, that "Austria's survival as a Great Power is as necessary to Germany as is that of France to Russia."

Our inquiry resolves itself into a double question: Has Russia an equally strong interest in the preservation of Austria-Hungary, and has her attitude in the past given proof of any desire to preserve it? At the very outset, we may rule out the classic instance of Russian intervention in 1849, which enabled the young heir of the Hapsburgs to reduce Hungary to submission. The action of Nicholas I. was dictated very largely by personal motives, and his armies were sent to support, not so much the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as the tottering principles of Absolutism and Divine Right. Long before the reign of Nicholas, however, Russian agents had found their way across the Carpathians, intrigued among the Ruthenes and Slovaks of Hungary, and kindled Russophil sentiment among the Serb immigrants of the Banat of Temesvár. Till the end of the seventeenth century, oppressed members of the Eastern Church relied more upon

the Turks than upon the Russians for help. But from the reign of Peter the Great onwards, the Czar's claim to be successor of the Eastern Emperors and the champion of the Orthodox Faith, took the more definite shape. The central idea of modern Panslavism—Russia as overlord of the entire Slav race—is the logical outcome of this claim. Strangely enough, it was the famous Francis Rákóczy, to-day the idol of Magyar Chauvinists, who first gave the Czars an opening for intrigue within the Hapsburg dominions, who first taught the Ruthenes to look to Russia, and who promised, in the Articles of his Alliance with Peter, "to do his best to make the Serbs abandon the Emperor's side." In the eighteenth century small risings occurred among the Serbs of South Hungary, and several thousands migrated to Russia; while Serb students began to find their way to Russian universities. The Empress Elizabeth built a church for the Roumanians of Kronstadt, and invited to Russia the oppressed Orthodox congregations of the Grosswardein diocese. Catherine II. did still more to encourage Slav sentiment beyond the borders of Russia. In 1774 she sent a Russian colonel to Tokay, to arrange the purchase of wine for the Imperial Court, and here the agency remained for nearly thirty years, though, needless to say, its energies were not confined solely to the inspection of vineyards. In 1821 Alexander I.

paid a visit to Bartfeld, on the North Hungarian frontier, and distributed presents to the Ruthene communes, and though this produced little or no effect, its motive became obvious when seven years later depôts of weapons were discovered in the possession of one or two Ruthene priests. The Russian Government revenged itself for the open sympathy of the Magyars with the Polish insurgents, by sending its agents to foment disturbances among the Slav peasantry of the border counties.

In short, intrigue in Austria-Hungary belongs to the settled traditions of Russian policy, which pursues the double aim of intimidating Austria and extending Russian rule. The failure which has hitherto attended this policy is due to the still lingering hope that the Austrian Government will give effect to Slav claims against the Magyars. The great danger of the immediate future lies in the resentment inspired in the non-Magyar races of Hungary by their political impotence and by the hectoring mood of their Magyar rulers—resentment which might have most alarming results in the event of foreign complications. The best safety-valve for this feeling is certainly Universal Suffrage, but there are grounds for fearing that the promised measure of electoral reform may be so "doctored" as to secure to the Magyars their present unfair predominance; and in that case, of course, the

discontent would remain. So long as Russia remains enfeebled by internal discord, Hungary may continue with impunity her quarrel with Austria. But if she does this without at the same time conciliating her subject races, she places herself deliberately in a position of extreme danger. Russia may revive with the same suddenness as Revolutionary France; a military dictator might seek in a war of expansion an outlet for discontent at home, or a revolutionary government, by the grant of self-government and equal rights to the subject races, might arouse such enthusiasm throughout the whole Slav world as to bring the ideal of a Panslav Federation within the range of practical politics. The idea underlying Panslavism is much older than its name, and many proofs could be adduced of its existence under Peter the Great and Catherine II. But it was under Nicholas I. and his successors that it became a real factor in European politics. Katkoff proclaimed the new era at the Slav Congress of Moscow in 1867, and a brilliant exponent of its aspirations was found in General Rostislav Fadejev, the soundness of whose judgment has so often been shown by subsequent events. This well-known Panslav writer held that Russia's salvation lay solely in the break-up of Austria, thus confirming Bismarck's view that Russia's road to Constantinople lies through Vienna.

And what was true in 1871 is still true to-day: "The Oriental question can only be solved in Vienna." In effect, the Russians are either the champions of Slavism and its future, or else Turanians, no true members of the European polity; no middle *rôle* between these alternatives is possible for them, and hence sooner or later "Russia must expand to the Adriatic, or withdraw once more behind the Dnieper." This is merely an extreme way of expressing the truth, that upon Russia's use or misuse of racial affinities, depends the possibility of her expansion to the West or South-West. In any such movement she has two obvious instruments ready to her hand—the programme of the Czech extremists, who aim at Bohemian independence and the extirpation of the German element in Bohemia, and the kinship of the unhappy Ruthenes, who are the victims of Polish and Magyar fanaticism. The manner in which the new Austrian Reform Bill has been watered down in Galicia to suit the palate of the Polish element, has aroused keen discontent among the Ruthenes of that province, and there is a danger that their unjust treatment may render them more susceptible to the overtures of Panslavism. Meanwhile the efforts to Magyarise the Slovaks and Ruthenes of North Hungary through the medium of the Church, are producing disastrous effects, which may not be without

influence upon the political situation. In 1903 several hundred Ruthenes left the Greek Catholic Church owing to the imposition of a Magyar-speaking priest upon their parish, and joined the Oriental Church. A monster trial at Mármaros-Sziget was the result, at which the leaders of the movement were sentenced to periods of imprisonment varying from seven to fourteen months, for "incitement against a confession" and "against the Hungarian nation"; and this incident has aroused intense feeling against the Magyars among the ignorant peasants of North-East Hungary, who are coming to regard Russia as their last resource in the struggle for their language and racial existence. The same fatal policy of Magyarisation is being pursued among the Slovaks, and only last November the Bishop of Zips transferred a priest from his charge "for Panslav agitation," with the result that his parishioners vowed to boycott the church until he should be restored to them, while (be it remarked *en passant*) some are threatening to go over to Protestantism. Church boycotting seems to be spreading among the Slovaks; an instance on a still larger scale occurred last summer at the little town of Rózsahegy, where a well-known Slovak priest, Andrew Hlinka, was deprived by the bishop for supporting the Slovak candidate at the parliamentary elections, and was then arrested and

(after detention in prison beyond the legal period) was sentenced for "Panslav agitation" to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1,500 kronen (£62 10s.). There is not the same danger, it is true, among the Slovaks as among the Ruthenes, of conversions to the Eastern Church (owing to the presence of Lutheranism among the former); but the intolerable grievances of the Slovaks offer an opportunity of intrigue to their Slav brethren across the frontier. So long as there is even the possibility of a great Russian revival in the near future, the policy which is responsible for such injustice and discontent in the Carpathians is little short of madness. The Hapsburg Monarchy has, it is true, in Poland what used to be described as her lightning-conductor for the Eastern Question—in other words, Austria in former days could always check Russian advance to the south, by fomenting discontent on her flank in Warsaw. But should Russia grant freedom to her subject peoples and place herself at the head of a great Slav movement (and this, improbable as it may sound, is an event which the future may have in store for us), then Austria-Hungary would be deprived of this safeguard and would find herself in a position of grave peril. As the hope of an Independent Poland grows yearly fainter, so the long-deferred reconciliation with Russia draws perceptibly nearer, with

national autonomy as its basis; and a reconciled Poland would become a loadstone irresistibly drawing Galicia to herself. The rise of Roumania and Bulgaria has taught Russia the lesson that Constantinople can only be won on the middle Danube, and that the friendship of the Poles would mean half the battle in a contest with Austria. With Galicia lost, Hungary's turn would come next, and what are seven or eight million Magyars in the midst of the Slav ocean?

Meanwhile Russia is not without allies among the South Slavs. King Peter, on his unsteady throne, is even more dependent than his predecessor upon Russian support; and the reserve with which St. Petersburg seems to meet his advances is more apparent than real. The Serb Radicals, who are now in power, have a strong anti-Austrian bias, which has shown itself in the attempted commercial agreement with Bulgaria, the tariff war with Austria-Hungary, and active intrigues among the Bosnian Serbs. The Serbo-Magyar *entente* of last summer was, at any rate from the Servian side, a mere move in the game of hostility to Vienna, and has cooled with strange rapidity. The Serb race, whether in the kingdom, in Dalmatia, in the occupied provinces, or in Hungary, regards Russia as its natural champion, and cannot, therefore, be drawn to the Magyars in their present mood of

Chauvinism. The chief hope of the latter and of Austria lies in the bitter rivalry between Serb and Croat, which, though patched up in recent years, is bound to break out sooner or later. Even the closest racial ties cannot avail to bridge over the religious difference which as one moves eastwards becomes a growing test of nationality. As the Serbs look to Constantinople and Moscow, so the Croats draw their culture from Rome and Paris; while the dreams which aim at restoring Zvonomir's kingdom and Stephen Dushan's empire are mutually exclusive and irreconcilable.

The true policy for Austria-Hungary lies in forestalling Russia by a lasting solution of the question of the nationalities. This can only be attained in Austria by the grant of provisional autonomy—in other words, by a compromise with the supporters of Federalism on the basis of the "October Constitution" of 1860: in Hungary, by the concession of some measure of local government to the various races, which would leave the central Parliament untouched, and would take the existing municipal and county autonomy as its groundwork. The necessity for some such concessions has long been apparent in Austria, and is being daily borne in by circumstances upon the unwilling Magyars. Austria-Hungary has been compared to a loaded cannon which may not go off

for centuries if the racial spark is not applied; but the lesson of 1849 showed that Russia has most to gain by its application, and if the opportunity should arise again, none will be found to imitate the unique self-denial of Nicholas I., when he held the destinies of the Hapsburg monarchy in the hollow of his hand.

The advent of Baron von Aehrenthal to the Ballplatz is an admirable demonstration of the maxim of Frederick the Great—make an ally of your most dangerous neighbour. The new minister has an unrivalled knowledge of Russian conditions, and took an important part in the agreement of Mürzsteg between Austria-Hungary and Russia. No man is, therefore, more fitted to smooth the relations of the two empires, or to advise his own country upon the course best fitted to disarm the temptations with which racial dissensions in the Dual Monarchy would inspire a renovated Russia. What Fadejev saw thirty years ago should be obvious to all to-day — that an Anglo-Austro-German alliance would be far more dangerous to Russia than an alliance of the Western Powers; but so long as other considerations render this difficult of attainment, the Dual Monarchy must seek guarantees for its integrity by internal adjustment of her racial dissensions, and by an arrangement with Russia similar to that by

which Bismarck once supplemented the Triple Alliance.

The need for a strong bulwark to stem the Turkish onset, was responsible for the rise and expansion of Austria; and so to-day the need for an effective barrier against Slav aggression affords the surest justification for Austria-Hungary's continued existence.

CHAPTER III.

ITALY AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

The recent declarations of Baron von Aehrenthal in the Austrian delegation, and of Signor Tittoni in the Italian Parliament, may fairly be regarded as a turning point in the relations of the two countries which they represent. The successor of Count Goluchowski, while emphasising the continuity of Austro-Hungarian policy, has introduced a new spirit of conciliation, in which the influence of the mailed fist is no longer perceptible. The self-denying ordinance which the two statesmen have now definitely proclaimed before the world, gains in impressiveness when we place their statements side by side. "We have declared," says Baron von Aehrenthal, "that we do not desire to step beyond the sphere prescribed by the Treaty of Berlin in any direction whatever, and therefore not in Albania either, and that we expect the same moderation from Italy." This assurance, he adds, has been given. The Italian Minister, after asserting that Italy is in entire accord with Austria-Hungary on the Macedonian and Albanian questions, declares

the result of his discussions with Count Goluchowski to have been that "if the maintenance of the *status quo* were no longer possible, Italy and Austria-Hungary should proceed jointly to a solution which should consist in the political autonomy of the Balkan Peninsula on the basis of the principle of nationality. . . . I therefore reject the advice to consent to a partition with Austria-Hungary." Statements so precise and so firm in tone have, doubtless, afforded keen disappointment to the many unscrupulous fishers in troubled Balkan waters—men whose advancement depends upon international complications. But for that very reason the prospect of a really lasting *entente* between Austria-Hungary and Italy will give intense satisfaction to all responsible statesmen of South Europe—and not indeed to them alone. In view of this highly desirable result, a suitable moment seems to have arrived for the discussion of the relations of Austria-Hungary and Italy.

This self-denying ordinance (as we have ventured to call it) is nothing else than a recognition of the Balance of Power on the Adriatic—and in some way a reversion to the mediæval situation when Hungary and Venice each had her sphere of influence on the Dalmatian coast. It is the logical outcome of the new situation created by Italian unity (the sole alternative being war, involving mutual

bankruptcy). The Turkish conquest of Hungary in the sixteenth century left Venice for three centuries without a rival on the Adriatic, and when the Republic fell in 1797, Austria stepped into her place, and after the short Illyrian interlude of the First Napoleon, ruled supreme from Trieste to the Straits of Otranto. Indeed, the first fifty years of the nineteenth century were for all Italy a period of Austrian domination. Firmly planted in Milan, Verona and Venice, and all-powerful at the petty courts of Parma and Modena, Austria controlled the Hapsburg Grand Dukes of Tuscany and pulled the strings of government (if government it can be called) at Naples and Rome. Thus from 1815 to 1848 the Metternich system was supreme throughout the entire peninsula. The great revolution of 1848—49 shook the Hapsburg dominions to their base, and from the chaos there emerged, in place of the old stagnant despotism of Francis and Metternich, the modified Absolutism which found its chief exponent in Alexander Bach. Still true to the double-headed eagle in her scutcheon, Austria from 1849 to 1859 continued her schemes of expansion on a double front—in Germany and Italy at the same time. This policy, based on the Concordat and Ultramontane support, received its death-blow at Solferino in 1859; and during the next seven years, while vexed internally

by constitutional experiments, Austria devoted all her efforts to the struggle for mastery in Germany. In 1866 the dream of a "seventy-million empire" under Hapsburg overlordship, was finally destroyed by Bismarck's tireless energy, and at the same moment Venetia was transferred by Francis Joseph to the young kingdom of Italy.

The results of Italian Unity upon the situation in the Adriatic could not fail to be momentous. The days when it could be ruled as an Austrian or Venetian lake were over, and for the first time in history two Powers of the first rank in Europe faced each other across the narrow sea. From 1797 to 1866 Italy had remained a negligible quantity on the Adriatic; henceforth, however unpromising her internal situation might be, her wishes could no longer be simply disregarded. For fifteen years after Sadowa, Italy's isolation was alarming, and the dangers from her Eastern neighbour were emphasised by the Ultramontane sympathies of the Viennese Court. Happily, financial necessities imposed upon both countries an attitude of sullen inaction. It was only the renewed prominence of the Eastern Question and the growing suspicion with which Austria-Hungary regarded Russia's Balkan policy during the 'seventies, that outweighed the Hapsburg distaste for an alliance with the usurper of the Quirinal; and

the scale was probably turned by the strong Italian sympathies of the Magyars, then represented by the all-powerful Andrássy. Austria-Hungary needed assured peace upon her western frontier, that she might be free to pursue in the Balkans that policy of expansion which events had rendered impossible for her in Italy and Germany. The acceptance of an European mandate in Bosnia, by offending Russia, threw Austria-Hungary definitely into the hands of Germany, and the adhesion of Italy to this alliance became merely a matter of time, which the Tunis incident finally determined. The fact that Italy failed to secure a share of the booty at the Congress of Berlin was probably due to the want of skill on the part of her envoy, since neither Bismarck nor Disraeli seem to have been opposed to her occupation of Albania. In any case, her failure served to emphasise her isolation, and prepared public opinion in Italy for the Triple Alliance. What results would have ensued from an Italian occupation of Albania it would be unprofitable to discuss; for with every year which elapsed since the Congress, it became more evident that the neutrality of that province was the only safe solution to the problem. This has now been publicly admitted by the Foreign Ministers of the two allied Powers, and the "three stages of Austrian advance"—Serajevo, Vallona, Salonica—can no

longer figure in the repertory of the Servian Press. The future of Albania as a separate entity is thus assured, and since many observers regard her people as the most virile and capable of all the Balkan peoples, the time may not be far distant when her magnificent harbours will become the portals through which the culture and commerce of the West can permeate the Balkan Peninsula. Vallona, as an Austrian war port, would dominate the whole coast of Italy from Taranto to Venice, or in the hands of Italy, would supply her with a cork for the Adriatic bottle which would far more than compensate for her dearth of east-coast harbours. Until the neutrality of this port had been secured, the interests of the two rivals ran counter to Albania's emancipation from barbarism and anarchy. These latest pronouncements will, it is to be hoped, form a prelude to reform in this, the most neglected province of European Turkey. Nor can the Macedonian question supply material for a quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Italy, if the former really has no intention of advancing beyond Novibazar; and from this step she is precluded by Baron von Aehrenthal's disclaimer of all schemes of expansion.

Turning from problems of the Nearer East, we find the most fruitful source of difficulties between Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Irredentist

movement (the Italian counterpart of Panslavism, Pangermanism, Jingoism, and other racial extravagances), which, strangely enough, reached its high water mark at the very time when reasons of State dictated the Triple Alliance. The Irredentists, at the height of their pretensions, claimed Southern Tirol, Trieste, and the entire Istrian and Dalmatian coasts, as belonging of right to the unified kingdom of Italy. But the nineteenth century has been marked on the eastern Adriatic coast by a gradual ebb of the Italian population before the advancing tide of Slav Renaissance. Ragusa—Italianised if not Italian in the days of its independence—has now long been a focus of Slav culture; Serbo-Croat has become the official language of Dalmatia, and even in 1890 was spoken by 96 per cent. of the population. Only Zara and Fiume hold their own desperately against the inroads of Croatian and Magyar Chauvinism and the *Drang nach Osten* of German commerce. In the entire coast provinces, from the suburbs of Trieste to Cattaro, there are now little more than 150,000 Italians. Thus even the wildest Irredentists have come to recognise the hopelessness of reclaiming provinces where the Italian element is in a minority of one in seven, and confine their aspirations to Trieste and its Littoral, and to the Trentino (the Italian portion of Tirol). In the case of the former, sentiment rather than

interest dictates the attitude of the Trieste population. Since 1382 the city has formed part of the Hapsburg dominions, and owes whatever prosperity it has enjoyed in the past entirely to its position as outlet to the Austrian Hinterland. Now that Austria is becoming a manufacturing country and forms the connecting link between the industries of Germany and the Mediterranean, Trieste is more necessary than ever to the Austrian Empire, and will reap an ever-increasing benefit from the connection. The new harbour works, which have been so much discussed in the Reichsrath, prove the truth of both contentions. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Venice sought to recover Trieste, as a means of checking Hapsburg development, and her success would have meant the commercial ruin of the city. In the same way to-day the union of Trieste to Italy would mean her abdication in favour of Venice, whose position is now strengthened by the opening of the Simplon Tunnel. So long as the two cities remain the feeders of Lombardy and Austria, there is room for both as prosperous and progressive seaports. The inclusion of both within the same system must be fatal to one or other (as the history of Venice from 1800 to 1866 clearly shows), and this time the victory would not rest with Trieste. The permanent danger to the peace of Europe involved by the exclusion of Austria from her only

good seaport is too obvious to require comment. Hence the *Municipio* of Trieste (whose telegram at the death of Humbert caused such a sensation) may continue to demonstrate in favour of the King of Italy; but motives of self-preservation will restrain them from ever putting their theories into practice.

The Irredentist claim to the Trentino rests on a much firmer basis, since the Italians of Tirol form a compact mass of 370,000, and since moreover the racial boundary corresponds with the geographical and strategic frontier. But racial fanaticism accounts for most of the friction, and has been fanned among the Italian population by the activity of the *Deutsches Schulverein* and other instruments of Germanisation. The impolitic attitude of the Austrian Government served to make matters worse, and the regrettable incidents of Innsbruck in 1903 contributed more than any external event towards loosening the Triple Alliance, and smoothed the way for M. Loubet's visit to Rome. Happily, the Government of Vienna has shown far more consideration for the Italians in Austria in the last three years, and its impending recognition of Italian university diplomas will go a long way to smooth their ruffled feelings, even if no University is founded at Trieste. Under the new Parliament of Universal Suffrage German Chauvinism will never, it may be hoped, reach

the same lengths as in the evil days of the Badeni Ministry.

Twenty-five years ago Baron Sonnino wrote as follows:—"The possession of Trieste, under the existing conditions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is of the highest importance for it, and it would struggle to the death sooner than yield it up. Besides, it is the most favourably situated port for the entire Germanic trade. Its population is mixed, like that which adjoins our eastern frontier. To reclaim Trieste as a right would be an exaggeration of the principle of nationality. . . . Trentino, on the contrary, is without contest Italian soil, and would complete our defensive system, without having for Austria the importance of Trieste. But our interests in the Trentino are too trifling, in comparison with those represented by a sincere friendship with Austria." These words apply with equal force to the situation of to-day, and the subsidence of Irredentist feeling in Italy, which has been noticeable during the last three years, suggests that their wisdom has at last impressed itself upon public opinion. No two countries in the world stand to lose so much by war as Austria-Hungary and Italy. Each is still emerging from a financial situation bordering upon bankruptcy; each requires every effort to develop its nascent industries. While in Austria and Hungary alike the jealousies of rival

nationalities would be a source of weakness in foreign complications, in Italy the grinding poverty of large masses of the people, the still unsolved problem of the Temporal Power and the disasters of the Abyssinian campaign, are danger-signals which her statesmen are too far-seeing to neglect. In an *entente* between Austria-Hungary and Italy lies the chief hope for the future of Southern Europe, and no country has a greater interest in its attainment than Great Britain, who is bound to them both by traditional ties of friendship and sympathy.

CHAPTER IV.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURS.

I.

The attitude of Russia towards the Court of Vienna, and since 1867 towards the Dual Monarchy, has always been to a large extent determined by the situation in the Balkan Peninsula and by the policy pursued there by the House of Hapsburg. Hence we cannot leave the so-called "Austrian Question" and its bearings upon the neighbours of the Dual State, without passing in review the latter's policy on her southern frontier.

Whether it be true or not that Russia's road to Constantinople lies through Vienna, it is obvious that Vienna long formed the nucleus of resistance to Ottoman aggression, and that but for the rise of Austrian power, the Crescent might have penetrated much farther west than Buda. Indeed, ever since the Turks first gained a foothold in Europe, the march of events has conspired more and more with the natural laws which geography prescribes, to bring a Danubian empire into being; and thus the study of history only serves to confirm the view

that Austria-Hungary is not merely a diplomatic necessity in the Europe of to-day, but is also a naturally developed unit which has long since justified its existence. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries no less than four attempts were made from different quarters to found a strong central-European state. Louis the Great, by his union of the crowns of Hungary and Poland; the Emperor Sigismund, as King of both Bohemia and Hungary; the Polish King, Wladislaw Jagellon, who reunited Poland and Hungary, and whose death on the field of Varna (1444) decided the fall of the Eastern Empire—each succeeded in the task for a brief space of time, but each failed to leave any durable result behind him. One final bid for supremacy on the Danube was made by Hungary—under her great national king, Mathias Corvinus, the heroic Hunyády's son. But his greatness died with him, and within a generation of his death Hungary lost her independence on the fatal field of Mohács (1526). The Turkish Conquest destroyed all hope of a Magyar Empire on the Middle Danube, and the danger to Europe involved by the Sultan's presence in Pest decided the question in favour of the power capable of the greatest resistance—namely, the Dukes of Austria. When Louis II. fell at Mohács, Ferdinand of Austria claimed the vacant thrones of Bohemia

and Hungary in right of his wife, the sister of Louis; and the fact that both Diets, after refusing to admit his dynastic claim, yet *elected* him as their king, affords signal proof that even at that date Unity was recognised as a pressing necessity. Henceforth the Hapsburgs carried on the work of Hunyády, as the bulwark of Europe against the Turks. Their personal character—especially in the seventeenth century—seldom commands our respect, indeed their religious bigotry and despotic leanings are disagreeably in evidence; but even those who still wrangle to-day over the respective claims of the German, the Magyar and the Slav to pose as the champion of Christendom against the Turks, must admit that the chief glory in the long struggle lies with the Hapsburg monarchs and their stubborn resolution. The truth is that each race has contributed a great champion to the common cause—John Hunyády, under whom Hungary deserved the title of "*fortissimum et celeberrimum reipublicæ christianæ propugnaculum*," John Sobieski, the saviour of Vienna, and Prince Eugene, who, though a Savoyard by birth, was for years the pride and glory of the Imperialist armies. Under the latter and his comrade-in-arms, the Duke of Lorraine, Hungary was at length wrested from the hands of the infidel, the "military frontiers" were formed, with the great fortresses of Temesvár and

Peterwardein as their centres, and for twenty years the Hapsburg eagles waved above the castle of Belgrad. The *Drang nach Osten* is a much older impulse than the twentieth century, and dates at least from the days when Austria held Belgrad, and peopled the rich plains on either bank of the Theiss with Swabian and Alsatian settlers. The reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. were a period of Germanisation, and represent the most serious and promising effort to organise an unitary Austrian Empire on the basis of a single language —an idea with which the national feeling, kindled throughout Europe as an outcome of the French Revolution, was destined to play havoc. But the tendency towards expansion is never lost sight of in the policy of Maria Theresa and her great minister, Kaunitz. The two chief changes of her reign were, of course, the cession of Silesia to Prussia and the acquisition of Galicia as the Austrian share at the iniquitous partition of Poland. But another less striking territorial gain—Turkey's cession of the Bukowina to Austria in 1775—marks a fresh stage in her Eastward advance.

This province, which forms an Austrian outpost between Russia and Hungary, was really an integral part of Moldavia. Gregory Ghika, the Moldavian Hospodar, made energetic protests with the Porte, and even threatened to throw himself into the arms

of Russia. But the weakness of the two Danubian principalities was so apparent at this period, that Ghika's action produced no effect, and the transfer was speedily concluded. Austria had long cast covetous eyes upon the principalities, and indeed from 1718 to 1739 had occupied "Little Wallachia" as part of Prince Eugene's conquests. In the Convention of 1771 the Porte had pledged itself to restore this province to Austria, and the cession of the Bukowina was, in effect, intended to avert the fulfilment of this promise. But this gain would hardly have been possible but for the maintenance of close and friendly relations with Russia, and it was by a continuance of this alliance that Joseph II. hoped to secure further advantages on his southern frontier. His own design was to acquire Little Wallachia, Orsova and Belgrad, as well as the Dalmatian possessions of Venice; but he naturally did not turn a deaf ear to the Prussian suggestion that Wallachia-Moldavia should fall to Austria, the Crimea and Bessarabia to Russia, while the rest of Turkey should be guaranteed by the Great Powers. This proposal was in reality dictated not by any friendship for Austria, but by the desire to obtain Danzig and Posen as a modest brokerage for Prussian services. This became apparent after the great incident of the Turkish war—Loudon's capture of Belgrad (1789). Austrian successes

alarmed Prussia into open opposition, and the Court of Vienna, in its anxiety to preserve its hold upon Belgium (at that date the Austrian Netherlands), consented to restore her conquests and remained content with Orsova and a few insignificant places on the Hungarian frontier.[1]

The Napoleonic Wars put an end to all thought of expansion in Eastern Europe; indeed, at the disastrous peace of Schönbrunn (1809) Austria was shorn of some of her fairest territories, and was entirely cut off from the sea by the formation of the new French province of Illyria. But Austria's recovery—to a large extent due to the skill of her diplomacy—was surprisingly rapid, and in 1815 Vienna was the scene of a Congress which, for good or evil, has decided the fate of all Europe ever since. Metternich's whole policy may fairly be described as one of "organised inaction," and on this ultra-Conservative basis, aided by the mystic vagaries of Alexander I. and the Holy Alliance, the Austrian statesman continued to rule Europe, until the rise of those "twin adverse stars" Canning and Nicholas I. created a new

[1] That this withdrawal was not intended to be permanent is clear from the secret Treaty of Alliance between Austria and Russia drawn up in 1795 by Cobenzl (then Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg), but never ratified. In it the good services of Russia were relied upon for the acquisition of Venetian strongholds, and eventually of Bosnia and Servia.

situation. His resolve to maintain the *status quo* at all costs was rendered inevitable by Austria's position in Italy; but its failure was none the less certain from the beginning, and it was in the Near East that this first became apparent. The first inroad upon Metternich's authority was the battle of Navarino (1829), which really turned the scale in favour of Greek independence, and hence indirectly gave an impetus to the rise of national sentiment throughout the Balkans. The Treaty of Adrianople, which decided the future of Greece, Servia, and Roumania, definitely lowered Austrian prestige in the East, and Nicholas I. was actually encouraged to prepare strategic plans for her invasion. Henceforth Austria, though preserving appearances, was in reality acting on the defensive in the diplomatic world. The nineteen years which followed the Treaty of Adrianople, while a period of stagnation for Austria both in home and foreign affairs, were for the Balkans, and especially for the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, a time of transition during which the national sentiment first awoke in earnest. The fact that this revival originated among the Roumanians (Wallachs, or Oláh, as they were still called) of Transylvania, profoundly modified the policy of Vienna on the lower Danube. Although the Russians were invited into Moldavia by the Hospodar, Michael Sturdza, there seems to have

been considerable sympathy for Austria in the two provinces—not, it must be confessed, with reason —and still more so in Transylvania, where the Roumanian districts almost to a man supported the cause of Vienna against the Magyars (1848). Indeed, it was Schaguna, the Greek Orthodox Bishop of Hermannstadt and leader of the Transylvanian Roumanians, who first called in the Russian troops during the anarchy of civil war; and though they were withdrawn again at the request of the Austrian Government, only two months elapsed before the same Government invited them to return and quell the Hungarian insurrection. A wave of Chauvinism had closed the eyes of the Magyar leaders to their community of interests with the Roumanians, who, like them, form a racial island in the vast Slav ocean; and when Kossuth and Batthyány offered concessions to Roumanian sentiment, it was already far too late.

During the 'fifties, under the bureaucratic *régime* of Alexander Bach, many Austrians entertained the idea of reviving the ancient Roman province of Dacia within the bounds of the Hapsburg Empire; and this idea certainly influenced the attitude of Vienna towards the crisis leading up to the Crimean War. But the uncertain and vacillating foreign policy of Count Buol deprived Austria of the substantial bribes which Nicholas I. offered for her

friendship, without on the other hand securing for her the confidence, still less the gratitude, of the Western Powers. Her refusal to join in the war and her insistence upon the neutrality of the Principalities, which deprived the allies of their sole base for a land attack upon Russia, really saved the Czar from the consequences of his isolation. But so purely negative a service appeared little better than treachery to the choleric Nicholas, when compared with the whole-hearted assistance which he had rendered in 1849. In short, the Crimean War left Austria completely isolated in Europe—Russia resentful and suspicious, Prussia already gathering for the spring, the Western Powers frankly hostile and in growing sympathy with the Risorgimento. This isolation earned Buol repeated rebuffs in the Near East, especially after the Austrian troops were withdrawn from the Principalities (1858). Napoleon III., by posing as the champion of nationality, struck a deadly blow at Austria, the effects of which were at once perceptible not only in Italy and Hungary, but also at Belgrad and Bucarest. For many years to come, the advantages of a buffer state on the lower Danube seemed to Austria to be far less obvious than the danger of a second Piedmont arising on her Transylvanian frontier. She therefore opposed the union of Moldavia and Wallachia as strongly

as the expansion of Servia; and nothing shows more strikingly her moral and diplomatic bankruptcy under Bach, than the manner in which both Servia and the Principalities set her wishes at defiance. In December, 1858, Alexander Karageorgevitch (the father of King Peter) was ejected by the Servians, and replaced by the anti-Austrian exile Milosch Obrenovitch; while in the following month Alexander Couza was elected Prince by the assemblies of Bucarest and Jassy. Austrian opposition was broken by the disastrous war with France, and Couza, under the protection of Napoleon III., signed a convention with Kossuth and the Magyar Emigrants. The central ideas of this agreement were, Roumanian aid for the Magyars, far-reaching concessions to the non-Magyar races of Hungary, and finally a Confederation of the three Danubian States — Hungary, Servia, and Moldavia-Wallachia. The whole affair ended in smoke, and Austria, still haunted by the fear of agitation in Transylvania, reverted to her old dream of aggrandisement on the Danube. Indeed, she can hardly be blamed for this ambition; for at one time Napoleon III., who had so often befriended the Roumanians, was ready to hand them over to the tender mercies of Austria, in return for the cession of Venetia to Italy. When in 1866 Charles of Hohenzollern was elected Prince of

united Roumania, it was only the war with Prussia which prevented Austria from interfering, and her attitude towards the little State remained unfriendly until Count Andrássy became Foreign Minister of the reconstructed Dual Monarchy. This far-seeing statesman upheld the view that the shipwreck of Roumania in Russian breakers would be a far greater danger for Austria-Hungary than the development of a national Roumanian State, and he therefore advocated the cause of Roumanian independence at the Congress of Berlin. Roumania's active espousal of the Russian cause against Turkey was so obviously prompted by dire political necessity and not by any national inclination, that it did not impair her relations with the Dual Monarchy, and Andrássy's policy has on the whole governed these relations ever since, despite occasional friction on the matter of tariff or Danubian navigation. To-day there only remains one serious obstacle to friendship between Austria-Hungary and Roumania—the Roumanian Question in Transylvania—but this has at least once led to the fall of a government in Bucarest, and is for many reasons acuter to-day than ever. On the one hand, the policy of Magyarisation pursued since 1867 in Transylvania, the methods adopted to prevent the Roumanians from entering Parliament, the systematic persecution of the Roumanian Press

in Hungary,[1] the monster political trial which followed the Roumanian petition to Francis Joseph in 1892, the suppression of the committee of the Roumanian political party in 1894; on the other hand, the growth of a Daco-Roman ideal[2] in Bucarest, and the active support rendered by the "League for the Cultural Union of all Roumanians" to victims of Magyar Chauvinism in Hungary—these facts, and the numerous incidents arising from them, have created a permanent state of friction between Bucarest and Budapest, and have prevented any genuine *entente* between Roumania

[1] From 1884 to 1894, 44 trials of Roumanians for Press offences took place in Hungary, in which 80 persons were condemned to terms of imprisonment amounting in all to 54 years, and to fines whose total exceeded £1,000 (10,660 fl.). Elaborate statistics of these trials are to be found in Eugene Brote, *Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn* (Berlin, 1895), pp. 395—418. Since 1894 such political trials have by no means ceased, and only last January the *Pester Lloyd* announced that no less than nine Press actions were pending against five Roumanian papers in the south of Hungary. At present Mr. Stephen Petrovic, Deputy for Nagy-Zorlencz, is undergoing a term of six months' imprisonment for "instigation against the Hungarian nation"; Mr. Juriga, the Slovak Deputy for Stomfa, has either gone or is shortly to go to prison for two years on a similar charge; and Mr. Milan Hodza, another Nationalist Deputy, has also been sentenced to a month's imprisonment. Enough has been said, without referring to the notorious Hlinka trial of last autumn, or to the fairly recent actions against the Ruthenes in Mármaros-Sziget, to show that the present Coalition Government has taken over the methods of the Liberal Party under Tisza and Bánffy against the non-Magyar races.

[2] Daco-Romanism aims at reviving the old Roman province of Dacia, and thus annexing Transylvania, the Bukowina, and Bessarabia to the present Kingdom of Roumania.

and the Dual Monarchy. At this moment, the Party of Independence, deaf to the wise counsel of their founder and idol, the great Louis Kossuth, is summoning all its strength for a final effort of Magyarisation, spurred on by fear of the possible effects of Universal Suffrage. The new Education Bill of Count Apponyi, which openly violates the principles of the Nationalities Law of 1868, is nowhere resented more keenly than among the Roumanians of Transylvania, whose cultural existence and Church autonomy it seriously threatens; and it is hardly likely that the Roumanians of the Kingdom will refrain from all expression of opinion in a matter which touches their kinsmen so nearly. Dislike of the Magyars does not of course blind Roumanian statesmen to the need of an understanding with Austria-Hungary, nor does it prevent the cultivation of friendly relations with Vienna; but it was, to say the least, unfortunate that the movement for an Austro-Roumanian *entente* (behind the back of Hungary) should have been engineered by that militant anti-Semite Dr. Lueger,[1] whose insolent references to the Hungarians as "the Judæo-Magyars" caused so much offence during the summer session of the Delegations in 1906.

The new Liberal Premier of Roumania, Mr

[1] Mayor of Vienna and leader of the Christian Socialist party.

Demeter Sturdza, in a speech delivered in the Senate in November, 1893, and devoted to the Roumanian Question in Transylvania, indicated the lines on which this whole problem should be approached. "No one in our kingdom," he said, "thinks of conquering Transylvania, because we do not possess the strength for such an undertaking, because such an undertaking even were it possible would of necessity involve the disruption of Austria-Hungary, and because this destruction would be fatal to the Roumanians themselves and would cause a general disturbance in Europe. . . . The existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is a European necessity of the first order, just as the existence of the Roumanian State is also. As the former cannot undertake anything against the existence of the Roumanian State, so the Kingdom of Roumania cannot take steps against the existence of Austria-Hungary. That is the political basis of the conditions in Eastern Europe, and hence all Irredentist tendencies are nothing but absurd and morbid fancies or criminal designs; hence, fortunately, such tendencies cannot gain ground, and have no political significance whatever." The truth of this statement is more obvious than ever, in the present circumstances of Europe. But the burden of proof rests with the Magyars. Their present policy towards the non-Magyar races

is as perilous as it is shortsighted, and that friendship with Roumania which Hungarian statesmen profess to desire so ardently, can never be realised until they cease to treat the Nationalities as political helots. The days of the supremacy of one race over another are past, at any rate for Europe; and the Magyars, instead of indulging in Oriental daydreams, must accommodate themselves to the hard logic of facts. Their mad policy of forcible assimilation aggravates the very evils which it is intended to remove, and no more certain way of propagating Irredentist feeling in Transylvania could possibly be devised. And only the most reckless optimist can afford to ignore the dangers which would ensue to Hungary in the event of separation from Austria and the political isolation which that would involve.

II.

The proclamation of Roumania as an independent kingdom (1881), the striking material progress which she has made during the last quarter of a century, and not least of all the splendid efficiency of the Roumanian army (first revealed to Europe at Plevna), have led the Dual Monarchy to abandon all idea of expansion on the Transylvanian frontier. But this has only had the effect of concentrating her attention upon

a still nearer neighbour, the little kingdom of Servia.

It would be easy to argue that her attitude towards Servia has been permanently hostile and dictated by dreams of conquest; yet the fact remains that she has twice resisted a Russian proposal of annexation. Even Kara George, the first leader of Serb independence, had serious thoughts of submission to Austria, and his son Alexander, whom the Skuptshina elected Prince in 1842, was throughout his reign entirely amenable to Austrian influence. The Obrenovitch dynasty, on the other hand, was long identified with hostility to Vienna, and Prince Michael, the ablest ruler whom modern Servia has produced, maintained friendly relations with Kossuth during the war of 1859. Michael's exiled rivals, the Karageorgevitch, enjoyed the support of the Austrian Government; but Austrophil sentiments again prevailed after Prince Michael's murder, and the pretender's party was left to its fate for many years. The brilliant but shallow Milan Obrenovitch became at certain epochs of his life little better than a crowned agent of Vienna, and the nation's loss of confidence in its first native dynasty is very largely due to the latent antagonism between Servia and the Dual Monarchy. The latter's friendship certainly stood Milan in good stead in 1885, when Servian rashness provoked

the disastrous war with Bulgaria, and when a Bulgarian occupation of Belgrad was only prevented by the firm action of Count Kalnoky. But no amount of diplomatic services could atone, in the eyes of the Servian nation, for the crowning offence committed by Austria-Hungary in 1877—78; and the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,[1] while deeply offending Russia and hence committing Francis Joseph to an alliance with Germany, had the further effect of finally marring the relations of Austria-Hungary and Servia. These relations had already grown somewhat strained, owing to the enthusiasm with which the Magyars espoused the cause of the Turks in their struggle against the Slavs. In Budapest a sword of honour was presented by public subscription to Abdul Kerim, the Turkish victor over Servia; and General Klapka, the gallant defender of Komorn in 1849, joined the Turkish army as a volunteer. General Stratimirovitch, who had led the Serbs of South Hungary in 1849, and who now placed his sword at Milan's disposal, was arrested by the Magyars, and Mr. Miletitch, a Serb deputy in the Hungarian Parliament, was also thrown into prison for his

[1] It was Bismarck's approval which finally turned the scale in favour of the occupation; and thus the statesman who once declared that the whole Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier, is indirectly responsible for the later *Drang nach Osten*.

advocacy of the Servian army and the Servian Loan. Such incidents, however, were as nothing compared to the great fact of the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and this is still resented as bitterly as ever by Servian patriots, who regard these two provinces as part of the Greater Servia of their dreams, and who watch with alarm the progress made there by German commerce and the German language. The rival claim of the Croats to Bosnia, and the proselytising designs of the Clericals of Agram and Vienna, are answered from Belgrad by Pan-Serb propagandism and by a plentiful crop of Austrophobe pamphlets and Press rumours. Few people in this country, however, are likely to be won over by such manœuvres, and the wonderful transformation wrought in the two provinces by Austro-Hungarian rule hardly tempts us to favour their surrender to the tender mercies of King Peter. The shade of Stephen the Throttler seems still to hang heavily upon his land, and no one can seriously maintain that the culture of Belgrad is equal to that of Vienna or Budapest.

There can, however, be no question that Austria-Hungary at present blocks the political and economic progress of Servia. In addition to Bosnia and Herzegovina, she enjoys control of the Sandjak of Novibazar, which is doubly

important in that it commands the route southwards to Salonica, and separates Servia from the kindred Serb nation of Montenegro.[1] In other words, the fixed policy of Vienna since 1878 prevents Servia's natural expansion to the sea on the lines of what she regards as clear historic and ethnographic rights. She feels the fingers of her unwieldy neighbour round her throat, and the pressure is rendered the more acute by the absence of railway communication to the Adriatic. Until this want is supplied, Servia can find no outlet in Western Europe for her trade, and must perforce revolve in the commercial orbit of Austria-Hungary, who at the same time interferes with her commercial arrangements with Bulgaria. The High Finance which in reality controls the Eastern Question favours the *Drang nach Osten* of German commerce, and Servia can hardly hope to escape from its thraldom until a railway has been built from Nisch to Medua or some other place on the Albanian coast.

Thus everything points to the vital necessity for Servia of a *modus vivendi* with Austria-Hungary,

[1] Of Montenegro and its possible future as a Slav Piedmont it is impossible to speak within the present limits. It is sufficient to point out that Austria's possession of Cattaro (which is not likely ever to be relinquished) makes real cordiality between her and the little principality impossible, and that Prince Nicholas, replying upon his dynastic alliance with Italy, is now more likely to seek outlets in Albania than on his northern frontier.

and the Pashitch Cabinet, despite its able and vigorous attitude, will undermine its own position and that of the Karageorgevitch dynasty if an agreement is postponed much longer. Baron von Aehrenthal, the new Foreign Minister at the Ballplatz, showed a conciliatory spirit towards Servia in his first public pronouncements; and if, as seems likely, he returns to the old Balkan policy of Andrássy and Kalnoky, the difficulties in the way of peace should not prove insurmountable. Indeed, his explicit announcement that Austria-Hungary seeks no further territory in the Balkans, deprives Servian statesmen of their chief excuse for distrust of Vienna. The real danger lies in the power of the army in Servia and in the need for conciliating its anti-Austrian chiefs. Indeed Dr. Pashitch's government is between the devil and the deep sea. Under the headstrong Alexander, the advocates of national expansion and of democratic government were drawn together by a natural process, which in the long run proved too strong for an autocratic and Austrophil sovereign; and so to-day the Radical leader has to avoid all appearance of friendliness towards Vienna, and yet to find some remedy for the disturbance of trade which the present situation involves. He has, it is true, succeeded in floating the new loan (at a high rate of interest) and in placing the order for fresh

armaments; but the closing of the northern frontier to Servian live stock and grain deprives the country of its most important market, and the consequent losses to Servian producers are causing very general discontent. On the other hand, a surrender to Austria-Hungary's demands in the tariff war would be most unwelcome to his own party, and would alienate national sentiment from the present *régime*. The wild rumours which have been going the rounds of the European Press of late concerning Servia need not be taken too seriously; but he would be an optimist indeed who would venture to describe the position of King Peter and Dr. Pashitch as anything but precarious.

Meanwhile the attitude of Austria-Hungary towards her southern neighbour is always more or less dependent upon the situation in Croatia, where Vienna still plays off Pan-Serb and Pan-Croat against each other, and profits by the hatred of Agram for Budapest. For the moment the Croatian situation does not make for friendly relations with Servia. The ill-considered tactics of the Hungarian Coalition in causing the fall of the dominant party in Croatia at last year's elections, is now bearing fruit in Parliamentary disorganisation, and the Government can only subsist by proclaiming that it stands outside party politics. The Starcevic Party, which has recently carried obstruction to

unheard-of lengths, has forced its opponents to concession; and the uncertainties of the future are likely to accrue to its political advantage. Their triumph would place the central government in Budapest in a most embarrassing position; for the Starcevic Party aims at the establishment of an Independent Croatia within the bounds of the Hapsburg Monarchy. It demands the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia to Croatia, and thus virtually aims at the reconstruction, on a larger scale, of Napoleon's Illyrian state. These aspirations, and the historic arguments on which they rest, are keenly opposed by the Serbs, who still dream of reviving the ancient Servian Empire of Stephen Dushan; and hence Dr. Frank, the leader of the Starcevic Party, is violently anti-Serb. Religious fanaticism embitters the quarrel, for the Croats encourage Catholic propagandism in Bosnia, as a means of winning the population for their national cause; and the Serbs, in their zeal for the Orthodox Church, are not far from declaring war upon Western culture as a whole. Curiously enough, the leaders, except when drawn from the ranks of the clergy, are seldom practising Catholics, and fanaticism and *libre pensée* are very often combined in the same persons. The Croats can boast of a culture which, if less ancient, is distinctly superior to that of the Serbs; but despite their headlong

bravery and tenacity of will, they have never shown signs of possessing those political talents which alone could justify their separate existence. The erection of a "Magna Croatia" according to the Starcevic ideal, is less at variance with purely Austrian interests than would appear at first sight, since to make Prag and Agram the capitals of two Slav kingdoms within the Hapsburg Empire would supply an effective check to Pan-German designs. But the price to be paid for this security would be Federalism, with all its unknown dangers —and the prevention might well prove worse than the cure. For the Dual Monarchy as at present constituted, the Pan-Croat ideal is an impossible scheme, since the position of the Magyars would be seriously menaced by a compact and autonomous Slav State planted between them and their only access to the sea.

Enough has been said to show what vital issues are involved in the rivalry of Croat and Serb; and we shall do well to remember that the whole eastern coast of the Adriatic still remains an unsolved equation in the arithmetic of Europe, and that the future of Servia depends to a large extent upon the internal problems of Austria-Hungary.

CHAPTER V.

AUSTRIA VERSUS HUNGARY—THE INTERNAL PROBLEM.

"Quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat."

My endeavour in the preceding pages has been to show that Austria-Hungary is far from being so tempting a prey to expansive neighbours as is commonly supposed in our country, and that in each separate case the dangers of annexation would more than outweigh the possible advantages. To this argument must be added the historic fact that the territories to-day known as "Austria-Hungary" or the "Dual Monarchy" have repeatedly justified their existence as a unit in the European System, by surviving crises of the most acute and dangerous description. In the War of Austrian Succession most of Europe ranged itself against the helpless Maria Theresa, and her cause long seemed desperate. Yet though one fair province was finally wrested from her, her Empire not merely outlived the storm, but attained under her a commanding position in European diplomacy. During the Napoleonic wars Vienna was twice occupied by foreign armies, Austria was cut off from all access to the coast by the formation of

the new Illyrian State, and a seal was set upon the shame of surrender by a humiliating marriage treaty. Yet in 1814 Austria was in the van of opposition to Napoleon, and the Congress at which the reconstruction of Europe was achieved was largely the work of her statesmen, thus seeming to justify the old song's boast:

Es ist nur a' Kaiserstadt, Es ist nur a' Wien.

In 1848-49 no country suffered more severely from the revolutionary movement than the Hapsburg dominions, and after prolonged convulsions order was at length only restored by 180,000 Russian bayonets. Yet within eighteen months of Világos, Austrian diplomacy had imposed on Prussia the most striking diplomatic defeat of recent times, and despite financial chaos, Ultramontane reaction and bureaucratic despotism, two great wars were still required before Austria could be made to relinquish her claim to the primacy in Germany. Not merely these wonderful instances of Austria's recuperative power, but the whole march of events for many centuries past, constrain a belief in the historic necessity of a strong Central European State—in other words, in the continued existence of the Dual Monarchy, however modified internally, as an unit in the political system of Europe.

And yet the break-up of Austria-Hungary has

often been foretold by foreign publicists, and a belief in its probability seems to be more widely spread than ever. The credulous public accepted internal dissensions as a sure harbinger of evil, and did not stop to weigh the motives of these prophets of pessimism. Yet among these motives it is easy to detect many cross-currents of rival influence—the anti-German spleen of certain French journals, the Slavophil dreams of enthusiasts for the "Franco-Russe," the religious prejudices which cling around the *Los von Rom* movement, the party tactics of Magyar Chauvinists, the Pan-German determination to upset the apple-cart, the *arrière-pensées* of Balkan statesmen, the defensive or offensive manœuvres of Jewish finance. When all these influences are considered, the wonder is, not that there are prophets of evil, but that the *canards* have not been far more plentiful and shriller in their cry. The present writer disbelieves not merely in the probability, but even in the *possibility*, of a break-up of Austria-Hungary. But the simplest method of bringing home the arguments for this disbelief is to assume for one moment that complete separation between the two countries is a *fait accompli*. The conventional view of such a situation is that while Hungary *could* stand alone—at the risk of sinking to a Balkan standard, but at least without impairing her independence—Austria, on the contrary, could

not stand alone, and must inevitably fall to Germany. This is an entirely superficial view, and the exact contrary is far more probable. For if Austria and Hungary part company, it is obvious that they will not part as friends. Hence Hungary must, in case of separation, rely upon her own unaided strength for the immediate future. This would be a really serious prospect, since she would at the very outset be faced with the problem of a new army. The existing Joint Army is organised and administered on mainly Austrian lines, and in the event of separation the actual machine would of necessity remain in Austrian hands. Hungary would for the time be without a general staff, without an adequate supply of officers, without any organisation save that of the Honvéd (or territorial army), and virtually without artillery; while the introduction of Magyar as the language of command—a step highly distasteful to 54 per cent. of her population—would still have to be undertaken, and could not be accomplished in a day. While Austria would be free to concentrate her military resources and could almost certainly buy Germany's guarantee of her independent position by loyalty to the Dreibund and by commercial concessions,[1] Hungary, on the other hand, would present a well-nigh irresistible

[1] Perhaps even by entering the German Zollverein, while remaining politically independent.

temptation to her eastern and southern neighbours. It would be unwise to discuss the policy of Russia in such a contingency, the more so as we have already endeavoured to indicate her attitude to questions of the Middle Danube (pp. 18—23). But it is far from fanciful to argue that the real disturbance might come from the smaller States. Roumania, as has already been argued, knows that aggression against the Dual Monarchy would be little short of national suicide. But if she were faced by an isolated Hungary (still in the throes of army organisation), the situation would be very different. The Daco-Romanist party would again raise its head, and the government of the day might find it hard to resist the clamour for an invasion of Transylvania. Servia, too, might be inclined to seize the opportunity, in the idea of finding compensation in the Banat for the loss of Bosnia. Her army would probably welcome the distractions of war, and the new dynasty might stake its shaky throne upon a successful issue. The two accomplices, Servia and Roumania, might even secure the co-operation, or at least the benevolent neutrality, of Bulgaria, in return for a free hand in Macedonia. Such a combination would be distinctly formidable, for the three States can put an army of about 700,000 men into the field, and of these the Roumanian and Bulgarian contingents are second to none of their

size in Europe. Indeed, the growth of military power in the Balkans has created a very different situation from that of 1877, and the Great Powers may one day discover that the armed intervention necessary to enforce their wishes is not worth the accompanying risks.

Another dangerous factor in the new situation would be the Croats, who in the event of foreign complications would almost certainly follow the precedent of 1848 and attempt to realise their old dream of Magna Croatia. Whether Vienna might then be disposed to come to terms with Agram and to admit a reconstructed South Slav kingdom into the Austrian Empire, is a question which is better left unanswered. But even under the most favourable circumstances, the Croatian question would at once force itself upon the statesmen of an independent Hungary. For if the Compromise between Austria and Hungary is annulled, the Compromise of 1868 between Hungary and Croatia falls to the ground with it; and such delicate problems as the financial relations of Agram to Budapest, and Croatia's share in foreign affairs, must be re-discussed from the beginning. Hungary's position would be infinitely complicated by the question of the future of the Occupied Provinces—an ocean of troubled waters in which the many Jingoes of Agram would not hesitate to fish.

THE INTERNAL PROBLEM.

Turning to purely internal problems, we find that there are many reasons for doubting Hungary's capability of standing alone. First and foremost is the unsolved question of the Nationalities, whose very existence was till recently denied by the ultra-Chauvinists, but which in reality is more acute to-day than ever. After forty years of untrammelled Magyarisation, there are still 40 per cent. of the population of Hungary who do not know the language of State. An educated class is gradually forming among the Roumanians and Slovaks, whose poverty and agricultural pursuits long told against them; in parts of Transylvania the Roumanian language is steadily gaining ground against the Magyar; the foolish policy of passivity at the elections has been abandoned by the non-Magyars, and after universal suffrage has been introduced, their little band of deputies can hardly fail to return to parliament in increased numbers. Thus the outlook is slightly more favourable for the non-Magyars, and they can no longer safely be ignored when the question of separation is finally raised. Independence can only be realised if the entire nation, without distinction of race, presents an united front to the outside world. Internal harmony is impossible so long as one half of the nation makes the absorption of the other half its main object in life—so long as one race retains a

monopoly of political and administrative power[1]; and until this harmony is secured, Hungary is only courting disaster by the attempt to stand alone. The Magyars can use Vienna against the Nationalities as hitherto, or they can use the Nationalities against Vienna; they cannot resist them both together.[2] Thus it is not too much to say that the racial question in Hungary supplies the clue to the so-called "Austrian Question."

Intimately connected with this question of the Nationalities is the impending reform of the electoral system. On this point Hungary stands at a disadvantage towards Austria, where the Reichsrath spent most of last year in replacing the worn-out curial system by one of universal manhood suffrage,

[1] The Magyars cite their mistaken generosity towards the Croats in 1868 as a reason for refusing all concessions to the other races The answer is obvious: the fact of having given *one* race too much is not an excuse for giving five other races too little.

[2] A startling instance of the Magyar standpoint is afforded by a leading article of April 3rd, 1907, in the *Pester Lloyd*, which was long the official organ of the Liberal Party, and is still an advocate of Dualism. "If the coalition of parties," it writes, "is converted into a coalition of all Hungarians, in order to unite them in one camp against Austria, *against the nationalities*, [the italics are mine] against social revolution, then no one will stand aloof who is Hungarian in feeling and thought." Are then the nationalities "Uitlanders," not Hungarians? And what becomes of the boasted equality of all Hungarian citizens before the law, or of the famous legal fiction of "the one and indivisible Hungarian nation, of which every citizen of the Fatherland is a member, no matter to what nationality he belongs"? (Preamble to Law XLIV. of 1868, "On the Equal Rights of the Nationalities.")

and where the Cabinet, for the first time in recent years, is likely to have the new Chamber at its back, at least in all questions at issue with Hungary. In Hungary, on the other hand, the present franchise gives little or no indication of the feeling of large masses of the population: narrow class interests dominate the party counsels; and until parliament has been placed upon a democratic basis, ministers cannot pose as representatives of the national will, despite their crushing parliamentary majority.

A further source of danger is the social unrest which the altered conditions of to-day are arousing amongst the agricultural population of Hungary. In Syrmia (the district between the Danube and the Save) the Agrarian Socialist movement has already assumed considerable dimensions; and the news from Roumania will not help to pour oil on the troubled waters. Throughout the country emigration is gaining ground, and several hundred thousand peasants found their way to the New World last year.[1] The effect of this upon the labour market is likely to be seriously felt at the next harvest, and one County Assembly has actually gone the length of advocating Chinese labour for

[1] Emigration is no longer confined mainly to the Slovaks or other non-Magyar races, but is spreading among the cream of the Magyar peasantry in the Alföld, or great Danubian plain.

Hungary, rather than yield to the demand for higher wages. Social Democracy, in the international sense, is also spreading in the towns, and is making capital out of the reactionary views which prevail among the rank and file of the Independent Party.[1] A few years ago that party was violently Radical, and an alliance between it and the proletariat seemed not far off. To-day East and West are not farther apart than the Extreme Left of 1900 and the Social Democrats of 1907.

Closely bound up with the social problem is that of Hungary's economic progress. Though almost 70 per cent. of her population are employed in agricultural pursuits, the present Government is bent upon turning Hungary at the shortest possible notice into an industrial state. With this object economic separation from Austria is put forward as a prelude to the creation of an independent Hungary, and it is this startling economic policy which fills the friends of Hungary with so many misgivings for the future. Its dangers are obvious. Hungarian credit is bound to suffer by its severance from the *haute finance* of Vienna. Separation will involve increased taxation, since Hungary, instead of only

[1] Quite recently certain Independent Deputies demanded of the Speaker that he should prevent the Socialist Deputy, Mr. Mezöfy, from addressing the House, and their attitude seems to have met with the approval of other deputies, though, of course, not that of Mr. Justh, the present Speaker.

contributing a quota of 33 per cent. to the joint expenses of the Monarchy (as against 66 per cent. paid by Austria), will have to maintain out of her own unaided resources her full share of what are at present Common Affairs, besides setting up all the costly machinery of separate diplomatic and consular agencies, and of separate military and naval forces. Finally, the erection of a customs barrier between Austria and Hungary—as proposed by Mr. Kossuth, the Minister of Commerce—will entail heavy additional expenditure, if only for purely geographical reasons. The frontier of the two States is over 1,200 miles long—stretching from the Adriatic up to Pressburg and along the Moravian and Galician boundaries as far as the south-west corner of the Bukowina. A glance at the map will show that Austria holds Hungary in her arms, even if she renounces all connection with Bosnia, and that her geographical position, aided by her railway communications with Germany and Western Europe, would help her enormously in an economic struggle with Hungary. Austria is already as much stronger than Hungary economically as she is weaker than Germany; and even without the latter's backing, she has far less to fear from a tariff war. The prospect of an Agrarian majority in the new Austrian Parliament, and the dislike of the Croats for the present commercial policy of Budapest, are minor

factors in the situation which cannot safely be neglected.

Enough has been said to show that Separation between Austria and Hungary is a problem only slightly less grave and adventurous than that of disruption by foreign foes, and that what seems at first sight the lesser evil, may be nothing else than an inclined plane leading to the great abyss.

One final word. If, in view of the impending Peace Conference at the Hague, we look the facts of the European situation in the face, we are forced to the conclusion that Hungary and her separatist tendencies form one of the chief obstacles to Disarmament. The present Dual State is, by reason of its complex internal problems, essentially pacific by nature, and of necessity opposed to a policy of adventure on the part of any of her neighbours. But so long as Hungary strives after complete independence, it would be madness for Austria to make any concession to the cry of disarmament; and she is therefore compelled to give her whole support at the Hague Conference to those Powers who wish the proposals of the British Premier to end in a fiasco.

BOOKS CONSULTED.

THOSE readers who have followed me thus far, may find the subjoined list of books helpful in any further study of the subject. It makes no pretence to be complete, and is limited to books dealing with the *political* aspects of the question. A bibliography of Austro-Hungarian history in modern times, and of the racial question in the two States, must be reserved for another occasion.

CHAPTER I.—André Chéradame, "L'Europe et la question d'Autriche au seuil du XX^e^ siècle," and "L'Allemagne, la France et la question d'Autriche" (both decidedly anti-German); René Henry, "Questions d'Autriche-Hongrie et Question d'Orient," Paris, 1903; "Reflections and Reminiscences" of Prince Bismarck (especially the chapters entitled "Nikolsburg," "The Berlin Congress," and "The Future Policy of Russia"); Palacky, "Oesterreichs Staatsidee," Prag, 1860. The best text books on modern Austria-Hungary are: Krones, "Geschichte der Neuzeit Oesterreichs," Berlin, 1870 (German-Liberal in sentiment); Louis

Léger, "Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie," last edition (strongly Slavophil), and Sayous, "Histoire générale des Hongrois."

CHAPTER II.—Bidermann, "Russische Umtriebe in Ungarn," Innsbruck, 1867; General Rostislaw Fadejew, "Neueste Schriften," Leipzig and Vienna, 1871. The new "Čechische Revue" (in German), Heft 4, contains an account of the Hlinka trial.

CHAPTER III.—Loiseau, "L'Equilibre Adriatique," Paris, 1901; Luigi Chiala, "La Triplice e la Duplice Alleanza," Turin, 1898; George Weil, "Le Pangermanisme en Autriche," Paris, 1904 (fairer to the Germans than most French publicists).

CHAPTER IV.—Debidour, "Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe," 2 vols., Paris, 1891 (exceedingly thorough); Lyde and Ferryman, "A Military Geography of the Balkan Peninsula," London, 1905; W. Miller, "The Balkans," London, 1896; Ludwig Kossuth, "Meine Schriften aus der Emigration," 3 vols., Pressburg and Leipzig, 1880 (cursim); on Roumania—N. Jorga, "Geschichte des rumänischen Volkes," 2 vols., Gotha, 1905 (an admirable work); on the South Slavs and Servia—Léger, "La Save, le Danube et le Balkan," Paris, 1889;

Loiseau, "Le Balkan Slave et la Crise autrichienne," Paris, 1898; and two violently prejudiced pamphlets by Bresnitz von Sydačoff, "Die panslavistische Agitation und die südslavische Bewegung in Oesterreich-Ungarn," Berlin, 1900, and "Die Wahrheit über Ungarn," 1903 (a marvellous blend of Wahrheit and Dichtung); on the racial question in Hungary—Auerbach, "Les races et les nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie," Paris, 1898; Eugene Brote, "Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn," Berlin, 1895 (from the Roumanian standpoint: with a large number of reliable documents); Paul Hunfalvy, "Die Rumänen und ihre Ansprüche," Vienna, 1881 (from the Magyar side). There is no book in Hungarian which deals with the question of the Nationalities as a whole, still less attempts to interpret their point of view; two recent pamphlets by the veteran Mr. Louis Mocsáry ("A Válság," Eger, 1905) and by Mr. Szeberényi, the Lutheran pastor in Békéscsaba ("Gondolatok és Elmélkedések," Békéscsaba, 1906), are, unhappily, like voices crying in the wilderness.

CHAPTER V.—opera cit. Also Rudolf Springer (Dr. Carl Renner), "Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der oesterreichisch-ungarischen

Monarchie," Vienna, 1906; Bidermann, "Geschichte der oesterreichischen Gesammtstaatsidee (1526—1804)," 2 vols., Innsbruck, 1867, 1889; Tezner, "Die Wandlungen der oesterreichisch - ungarischen Reichsidee," Vienna, 1905. "Ungarns Ausgleich mit Oesterreich" (Leipzig, 1897), by Count Andrássy, the present Minister of the Interior, is specially instructive on the dangers which Separation would involve for Hungary.

Those who wish to limit themselves to a single work cannot do better than turn to the brilliant study of Dualism published recently by M. Louis Eisenmann, "Le Compromis Austro-hongrois de 1867," Paris, 1904.

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